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“Canopy of the Upturned Eye: Writing On Derrida’s Crypt” 
 
Derrida’s cryptic text Fors performs an unconditional and deconstructive return to Freud’s 
work on mourning through what this paper suggests is a silent and radical inscriptive opening 
onto an ethics of sexual difference. The title alludes to Derrida’s play in Points …Interviews with 
a homophonic dés and dais, dice and canopy, resonating chance with death in a “dais de l’oeil 
révulsé {canopy of the upturned eye}” and a new work of mourning. 
 
 
With this paper I aim to draw on Derrida’s writings that have addressed a relation between 
deconstruction and psychoanalysis, primarily in terms of Fors, Derrida’s forward to Abraham 
and Torok’s The Magic Word of the Wolf Man. This engagement implicates a number of 
concerns Derrida has engaged across a number of texts, concerns with the work of mourning, 
and a “beyond the mourning principle” of Freud; concerns with the ghost and the crypt, their 
relation and difference. And in the context of the crypt, concerns with a Nietzschean 
partitioning of the revenant and the arrivant in relation to sexual difference, that we have named, 
after Derrida’s Spurs, a “feminine operation.” And, finally, a concern with an ethics of the 
living-dead encountered in a deconstruction of pyschoanalysis’s binary of introjection and 
incorporation in the work of mourning, such that a silent refusal we recognize in Derrida’s 
response to Emmanuel Levinas operates the logic of the crypt that keeps safe the other lodged 
in me, even from myself. 
 
In discussing a “post-Freudian thinking of mourning,” Derrida suggests: “This carrying of the 
mortal other “in me outside me” instructs or institutes my “self” and my relation to “myself” 
already before the death of the other. … I speak of mourning as the attempt, always doomed 
to fail (thus a constitutive failure, precisely), to incorporate, interiorize, introject, subjectivize 
the other in me. Even before the death of the other, the inscription in me of her or his 
mortality constitutes me. I mourn therefore I am, I am—dead with the death of the other, my 
relation to myself is first of all plunged into mourning, a mourning that is moreover 
impossible.” (Points p.321) 
 
F—D. In secret, in truth, it is Freud who signed his texts. Every one of them. At least, that is 
what we are led to believe, what he leads us to believe in. It will have been the restricted 
economy of a titular imperative to think the possibility of Freud after him, that would lead us 
to co-sign, to consign him to the Freudian archive, the living dead. Already twenty-six years 
ago William Kerrigan and Joseph Smith had suggested: “He reads Freud as Freud read 
himself and others—with an eye toward the contingent, the haphazard, the chance event or 
lapse. […] overdetermination and chance are always co-implicated. Here is the place where 
Freud and Derrida meet. This is the point of Derrida’s deepest, though ambivalent, 
indebtedness to Freud” (viii-ix).  
 
“An eye toward the contingent.” How does one have an “eye toward the contingent”? How 
does one plan for, record or recoup the chance event, even, more so, the lapse? It is true, 
psychoanalysis, that which Freud names, engages the impossible recoup of the irrecoverable. 
Deconstruction may never have reached that destination. Reappropriation or mourning-
work, who would decide? We know there is more than a little debris from this band, this bind 
or stricture, a little breakage of the mirror, a little tolling for … . Our eye is towards nothing. 
It is “upturned,” immured. Our consigning of Freud after Derrida writes on the crypts and 
ghosts of psychoanalysis yet breaks in to nothing other than the canopy of this upturned eye. 
Our stratagems: the secret, the crypt, the ghost, the trans-phenomenal psychoanalysis of 
Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok, Jacques Derrida’s Fors. Yet it is sexual difference that will 
be our question. 
 
 
 
In Specters of Marx, Derrida, in the name of what we might call ‘hauntology,’ establishes a series 
of concerns that will have become ours: a respect for the ghost, the revenant, that complicates a 
metaphysics of presence through a spectral figure that is neither present nor absent, dead nor 
alive; a temporality of the contretemps, of a time-out-of-joint, of a time of a Freud after a 
Derrida, which is also the time of the arrivant, the future-to-come. We cannot avoid, as well, 
the final word of Specters, and the final note which quotes from Derrida’s The Post Card: “Here 
Freud and Heidegger, I conjoin them within me like the two great ghosts of the ‘great epoch.’ 
The two surviving grandfathers. They did not know each other, but according to me they 
form a couple, and in fact just because of that, this singular anachrony” (196). “Within me,” 
“they did not know each other,” and they did not know him. Yet he is always already co-
signed, two surviving grandfathers, two living on, suggesting there is no Derrida without them. 
There is also Nietzsche, the one Freud disinherited, the one to whom Heidegger devoted his 
most sustained effort. Derrida cites him in The Ear of the Other: “I am my father and my 
mother; I am my dead father and my living mother. I am their crypt and they both speak to 
me. They both speak in me so whatever I say, they address it to each other” (58-59). He then 
goes on to comment: “When it’s a text that one is trying to decipher or decrypt using these 
concepts and these motifs, or when one is looking for a ghost or a crypt in a text, then things 
get still more difficult, or let us say more novel. I say a ghost and a crypt: actually the theory of 
the “ghost” is not exactly the theory of the “crypt.” It’s even more complicated. Although it’s 
also connected to the crypt, the ghost is more precisely the effect of another’s crypt in my 
unconscious” (59). 1  
 
Derrida’s “crypt” is an operation we will come to name ‘Nietzschean,’ that shatters a certain 
dialectical movement in relation to an economy which puts in play the living dead and does 
not permit any sublation of the cadaver. This ‘living dead’ is ‘an irreducible doubleness’ and 
‘split dialectic of the negative’ of a divided self which the crypt alludes to, a self occupied by 
another’s crypt in the unconscious. This ghost is decipherable at the level of language and, 
more precisely, as languages themselves, bodies passing through a locus irreducible to sexual 
difference. Nietzsche says as much: 
 
There, this is who I am, a certain masculine and a certain feminine. Ich bin der und der, 
a phrase which means all these things. You will not be able to hear and understand 
my name unless you hear it with an ear attuned to the name of the dead man and the 
living feminine—the double and divided name of the father who is dead and the 
mother living on, who will, moreover, outlive me long enough to bury me. The 
mother is living on, and this living on is the name of the mother. This survival is my 
life whose shores she overflows. And my father’s name, in other words my patronym? 
That is the name of death, of my dead life. (54)  
 
Here ex-ists an irreducible doubleness as Nietzsche names two laws, two sexes, life and death 
(53). These are laws between the dead father’s signature, inheritance of concepts, as the law of 
proper names and the living mother, the one who hears-reads-interprets and is without proper 
name as the ear of the other that signs the text (51). Nietzsche’s feminine operation is “survival 
as the ultimate addressee in the phantasm, because he writes for her” (53). Our hypothesis is 
that it/id, the feminine operation, marks all texts as the irreducibly doubling plurality of an 
address across what Nietzsche sites as the dead-father and mother-who-lives-on. Ultimately at 
stake in this exhumation with respect to an acknowledgment of a ghost as sexual difference are 
the consequences with respect to them becoming the signatories of the work. This would 
suggest texts are written for, addressed to both the living and the dead, singularly and, perhaps, 
always and in general.  
 
 
 
2010 is a centennial year for psychoanalysis, perhaps one of the great centenaries of its myriad 
commitments to repetition. It was in 1910 that Sergei Constantinovitch Pankeiev, a young 
and wealthy Russian, came to Freud for treatment, commencing what the Standard Edition 
suggests is nothing less than “the most elaborate and no doubt the most important of all of 
Freud’s case histories” (17: 3). Sergei appeared in February; the history was written up, 
finished, by early November. It was not published for another four years.2 The case is titled 
“From the History of an Infantile Neurosis,” better known as “The Wolf Man.” Why does it 
hold such an esteemed place in Freud’s work? It was decisive for Freud to prove, against Adler 
and Jung, that the phenomenon of infantile sexuality exists. But more so, according to 
Nicholas Rand, the case shored up the three “cardinal tenets” of psychoanalysis as Freud 
invented it: the unconscious, infantile sexuality and the Oedipus complex (Rand lii). Abraham 
and Torok suggest something further. Contrary to the Standard Edition’s emphasis on the 
“extraordinary literary skill with which Freud has handled the case” (17: 6) in producing a 
work that “avoids the dangers of confusion and obscurity” (17: 6), Abraham and Torok stress 
something else: “Freud’s exposition is marred by an insidious incredulity” (Wolf Man 2). They 
emphasize what an astute reader would recognize as Freud’s own doubts about his 
statements. Moreover, they suggest that this ferment of “unconscious doubt” was itself 
productive of what appears to be an unrelated or “seemingly remote field of research,” 
“Mourning and Melancholia,” whose first draft appeared in 1914, the year of the case’s 
publication. Abraham and Torok read “The Wolf Man” neither as the shoring up of the 
origins of psychoanalysis, nor as that to be accommodated in the “late Freud,” but rather as a 
contretemp, what they call the moment of “isolation,” the “break” itself, neither as the early nor 
the late Freud. “The Wolf Man” is read with “Mourning and Melancholia.” 
 
In Fors, the foreword to their radical re-working of “The Wolf Man” case, Derrida approaches 
directly the literary-mytho-poetic psychoanalysis of Abraham and Torok in order to 
deconstruct the works of mourning and memory, as the narrative of what never happened. 
Through a deconstructing of the crypt, Derrida addresses his spectral differences and theirs. 
In doing so, he strategically maintains an ethical distance from any explicit reference to the 
ghost, phantom or hauntology that positions their conceptual differences from his. Here we 
attempt to maintain this difference, marked by silence, in recognition of the feminine 
operation of a living-on of spectral signatories, ghost workings not found within a crypt but 
founded on and structured by a crypt. This structure is a partitioning architecture, what we 
come to understand by Derrida’s notion of “tropological archi-text-tonics.” In our reading of 
Fors we sign the differences (Derrida’s, Abraham’s and Torok’s) with both hands: initially on a 
coincidence of what can never be comprehended but is always inscribed in the secret of the 
crypt as ghost work. And, then, with the other, there is the silent yet acknowledged refusal by 
Derrida as an ethical gesture, that marks out his approach to Abraham’s and Torok’s radical 
rethinking of the ghost in psychoanalysis. As Colin Davis suggests in État Présent, the core 
difference between the two hauntologies is to be located in the status of the secret: 
 
The secrets of Abraham’s and Torok’s lying phantoms are unspeakable in the 
restricted sense of being a subject of shame and prohibition. It is not at all that they 
cannot be spoken; on the contrary, they can and should be put into words so that the 
phantom and its noxious effects on the living can be exorcized. For Derrida, the ghost 
and its secrets are unspeakable in quite a different sense. Abraham and Torok seek to 
return the ghost to the order of knowledge; Derrida wants to avoid any restoration 
and to encounter what is strange, unheard, other, about the ghost. For Derrida, the 
ghost’s secret is not a puzzle to be solved; it is the structural openness or address 
directed towards the living by the voices of the past or the not yet formulated 
possibilities of the future. The secret is not unspeakable because it is taboo, but 
because it cannot not (yet) be articulated in the languages available to us. The ghost 
pushes at the boundaries of language and thought. The interest here, then, is not in 
secrets, understood as puzzles to be resolved, but in secrecy, now elevated to what 
Castricanno calls ‘the structural enigma which inaugurates the scene of writing’ 
(Cryptomimesis, p. 30). (379) 
 
From a Nietzschean operation of the crypt and sexual difference, the hauntology of a 
patronym and a living-on, we engage Fors’s secrecy on sexual difference. It strikes us as an 
enigmatic discourse opened through the structural haunting of Derrida’s crypt, as the not-yet-
formulated possibilities in/articulated in its text. This arrivant, this future-to-come—Freud after 
Derrida—is a going beyond of psycho-analysis toward differences (sexual, psychoanalytic, 
literary, philosophical) as a going beyond the work of mourning, as an “end” to mourning as 
such that would not throw up the ruse of an “end” as sublimated progression of a labor-
without-end. He would want to keep safe, even from himself, pocketed deep, that possibility. 
His signatories, his co-signatories, F — H, are anything but the ear who signs without a 
proper name. Her signatures, mother(s) as the name for living-on, are without remains, his 
ashes, his secret, even to the grave.  
 
 
